This 26 October 2007 article in the internal NSA newsletter SIDToday describes the agency’s special collection for then-Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s New York City trip for the United Nations General Assembly and provides a detailed study of the technology in action: see the Intercept article Finding Your Voice, 19 January 2018.
This 2005 letter from the internal NSA newsletter SIDToday responds to a previous article with further details about how the agency is dealing with Skype, noting that certain Special Collection Sites may have had access to Skype traffic, even at that point: see the Intercept article NSA Used Porn to “Break Down Detainees” in Iraq — and Other Revelations From 297 Snowden Documents, 1 March 2018.
This 20 April 2004 memo, originally published in the internal NSA newsletter SIDToday and written by the agency’s DEA Account Manager”, discusses NSA cooperaiton with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA): see the Intercept article Data Pirates of the Caribbean: The NSA Is Recording Every Cell Phone Call in the Bahamas, 19 May 2014.
This slide from a 2012 presentation shows the distribution of NSA collection points worldwide, including 80+ Special Collection Services (SCS) points based at embassies and consulates; 50,000 gained by Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) malware attacks and 20 “major accesses” from undersea cables: see the NRC Handelsblad article NSA infected 50,000 computer networks with malicious software, 23 November 2013.
An undated chart showing the sources of 103 ‘accesses’ to communications or computers made in a single week in 2009 at an NSA facility in San Antonio, Texas. Twenty-four accesses were collected from the major internet companies under the authority of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA), 21 from Special Source Operations on privately owned communications infrastructure (SOO), 19 from intercept of foreign communications satellites (Fornsat), 16 from intercepted radio communications (Conventional), nine were acquired by US spy satellites (Overhead), seven from foreign intelligence services (2nd/3rd party) and one from Special Collection Service operations based at embassies and consulates (SCS): see the New York Times article No Morsel Too Minuscule for All-Consuming N.S.A., 2 November 2013.
Recently released documents reveal that the joint NSA-CIA unit called the Special Collection Service (SCS) very likely targeted German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s mobile phone. Merkel’s phone number is a ‘Selector Value’ in the documents, and dates and active status also indicate that monitoring of her number began in 2002 and was active in June of 2013.
The SCS has sites in around 80 locations, including two in Germany. Der Spiegel reports that the SCS sets up equipment to intercept cellular signals, wireless networks and satellite communication from US embassies:
Nineteen slides from a 41-slide April 2013 NSA presentation describing the PRISM collection of data via internet service providers, “the SIGAD most used in NSA reporting.” Slides have been published gradually by several media organisations: see the Washington Post article NSA slides explain the PRISM data-collection program, 6 June 2013.